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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the trial court err by holding the defendant credit
union liable for torts committed by the independent
contractor towing company hired by the credit union?
Did the trial court err by failing to allocate to the
plaintiff the burden of proving that plaintiff1s vehicle
was damaged while under the control of the defendant?
Did the trial court err by allocating to the defendant the
burden of proving "for sure" that neither it nor the
independent contractor caused the damage?
Did the trial court err by imposing a "for sure" standard
of proof on the defendant to rebut a presumption of
liability instead of a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard?

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In

August,

entered

into

Employees
ster,

a loan agreement with defendant,

Credit Union,

VIN

teral.

1985, plaintiff/respondent,

Charley
Salt

Killian,
Lake

to purchase a 1966 Jaguar XKE-2d

1E12712, for which the Jaguar was pledged as

The

City

promissory

note included a provision

Roadcolla-

whereby

the

vehicle could be repossessed by the credit union in the event Mr.
Killian defaulted on the loan.

Mr. Killian defaulted on the note

by failing to make payments due in January, February and March of
1986.
The

credit

union

provided notice to Mr.

intent to repossess the vehicle.
union

hired

authorized
credit

a towing company as an independent
it

to

repossess and transport the

union for storage,

procedure.

On April 8,

pursuant to its

Killian
1986,

of

the credit

contractor
vehicle

normal

its

and

to

the

repossession

The vehicle was repossessed on either April 12 or 13,

1986.
Mr.

Killian

subsequently paid the loan balance in full and

took possession of the Jaguar on or about April 17, 1986.
Mr. Killian brought this action to recover costs incurred in
repairing the vehicle, which he charged was damaged by the credit
union

or

the towing company while the vehicle was

under

their

control.
This action was tried before a circuit court which
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff/respondent.

2

returned

SUMMARY OF, ARGUMENT
Defendant

hired

plaintiff's vehicle.

an

independent

contractor

to

repossess

As a matter of law, defendant is not liable

for

the torts of its independent contractor and

is, therefore,

not

liable for any damage to the vehicle occurring while in

the

possession or control of the independent contractor.
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence showing that the damage
to

his

vehicle occurred while in the exclusive control

defendant.

to

the

This lack of evidence precluded a presumption against

defendant from arising.
shift

of

defendant

and

Therefore,

the burden of proof did not

defendant had no

duty

to

rebut

the

presumption.
Even

if

the presumption had arisen,

defendant

need

only

prove that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable
than

its existence.

This burden is quite simple to meet

since

the vehicle was more likely to be damaged during transport by the
independent contractor than during storage by the defendant.
Since
independent

the

defendant

is not liable for the

torts

of

the

towing company and the trial court erred in shifting

the burden of proof to the defendant,

given the evidence,' defen-

dant is entitled, as a matter of law, to have the judgment of the
trial court reversed and a judgment entered in its favor.

3

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HIRED THE TOWING COMPANY AS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND WAS NOT AN EMPLOYER.
The

defendant has no contract or other permanent

relation-

ship with th<e towing company which picked up plaintiff!s vehicle.
Defendant

uses numerous towing companies and contracts with them

only on a single transaction basis.
the

towing

defendant's

Defendant merely authorizes

company to repossess the vehicle and deliver
premises.

it

to

It has no control over the means or me-

thods by which the towing company accomplishes the repossession.

POINT II
DEFENDANT IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE TORTS OF THE
TOWING COMPANY WHICH REPOSSESSED THE VEHICLE
FROM PLAINTIFF.
It

is well settled law that the employer of an

independent

contractor is immune from liability for the torts of the contractor.

57 C.J.S., Master & Servant, §§580-610 (1950); Restatement,

Second,

Torts § 4-09*

The exceptions to this general rule arise

where the employer has a non-delegable duty, does not use care in
selection of the independent contractor,
conduct

an

inherently

circumstances.

hires the contractor to

dangerous activity or in

other

similar

Tauscher v. Puget Sound Power and Light Co., 635

P.2d 426 (Wash. 1981).
The

Utah

case

law is supportive

k

of

this

position.

In

Dowsett v, Dowsett,

116 Utah 12, 207 P.2d 809, 811 (1949), the

Utah Supreme Court accepted the rule that "a principal cannot

be

held responsible for the torts of his agent where he has no right
of control over that agent."
In

Currie v. Sechrist,

$81 P.2d 700 (Ariz.App.

1978) the

independent contractor status of an automobile towing company was
sufficient

to protect the hiring shopping center from

liability

for the towing company's tortious conduct.
In another Arizona case,

two banks were defending an action

based

on

a tort committed by an independent auto recovery

ser-

vice.

The Arizona Appeals Court stated that the banks would not

be responsible for the torts of the independent contractor unless
one of the special exceptions applied.

Addressing whether the

auto repossession business was inherently dangerous such that
liability of the independent contractor should be assessed
against the principals, the court held that the act repossessing
an automobile did not involve "a special danger to others so as
to bring into play the exception to the non-liability rule of a
principal for the acts of an independent contractor."

Bible v.

First National Bank of Rawlins, 515 P.2d 351, 355 (Ariz.App.
1973), rehearing denied, review denied.
The

defendant aredit union used an independent towing

pany to repossess plaintiff's vehicle.

com-

Since there is no special

exception to the general rule of non-liability which affects this
relationship,
may

the

defendant is not liaTil^ for any damage

which

have occurred to plaintiff's vehicle while in possession

5

of

the towing company.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
VEHICLE WAS DAMAGED WHILE IN THE POSSESSION OF
THE DEFENDANT AND NO PRESUMPTION AROSE SHIFTING
THAT BURDEN TO DEFENDANT.
The
injury

general

rule

to his [property].

property to the bailee,
sion."

is that the bailor "must
.

show

that

. occurred after delivery of

an
the

and while it was in the bailee's posses-

8 C.J.S. Bailments § 50 (1950); 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles

§ 727 (1950).

The bailor has to meet this burden of proof before

a presumption may be made that the bailee was negligent in
ing the damage.
This

caus-

Id.

is also the Utah rule.

The presumption of a bailee's

liability arises only after proof that the property was destroyed
during bailment.

Barlow Upholstery & Furniture Co. v. Emmel, 533

P.2d 900 (Utah 1975).
In Staheli v. Farmers' Co-op. of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680
(Utah
against

1982),
a

the

bailee

court examined the
when

preumption

the bailee proves the

which

existence

arises
of

a

bailment and damage to the property:
The policy that sustains the presumption arises from the
practical consideration that one who is in possession of
another!s property is in a better position to control the
conditions that may cause loss or damage and to know, or at
^least to be able to ascertain, the cause of any actual loss
or damage.
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is
that the bailee be in exclusive possession, and it is that
proposition that gives logical force to the presumption.
Id.

at 683,

emphasis added.

The Staheli court held that where
6

the

property

was not shown to have been damaged

while

in

the

exclusive control of the bailor, the presumption did not arise.
In the present case,

the plaintiff has failed to show

that

the damage to his vehicle occurred while in the exclusive control
of

the

defendant credit union.

probable

Without such proof,

it is

as

in

the

that the damage occurred while the vehicle was

possession

and

under the control of the

towing

company,

over

which defendant exercised no control.
Because plaintiff has failed to prove that the damage occurred
no

while in the possession and exclusive control of
presumption

defendant.

defendant,

arose to shift the burden of persuasion

The

trial court,

therefore,

erred in

to

failing

the
to

allocate the necessary burden of proof to the plaintiff.

POINT IV
DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO
PROVE "FOR SURE" THAT NEITHER IT NOR ITS
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR CAUSED DAMAGE TO THE
VEHICLE.
As
torts

discussed

above,

the defendant is not liable

of the independent towing company.

vehicle

occurred

for

the

If the damage to

the

while it was in the possession of

the

towing

company, plaintiff's proper action is against the towing company.
Plaintiff
occurred

failed

to

produce

evidence

that

while the vehicle was under the control of

towing company or the credit union.
such evidence had been produced,

7

the

damage

either

the

Even assuming arguendo that

the burden of proof still would

not shift to defendant unless plaintiff showed the damage to have
occurred

while in the exclusive control of

defendant.

Staheli

supra.
The
damage

burden
occurred

specifically,

of proof lies with plaintiff to show
while in possession of the

while

in

that

bailors,- and

the exclusive possession of

more

defendant.

Only then does the burden of persuasion shift to defendant.
trial court,

the

The

therefore, erred in allocating to the defendant the

burden of proving "for sure" that neither it nor the

independent

contractor caused the damage.

POINT V
EVEN IF THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION HAD FALLEN
TO DEFENDANT, THE PROPER STANDARD OF PROOF
IS A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE RATHER THAN
A "FOR SURE" STANDARD.
Even
the

burden of proof.to the defendant bailee,

fault
that

in cases where the plaintiff has successfully

is rebuttable.
Jl

a

the presumption of

The Utah Rules of Evidence clearly

presumption

imposes on the party against

directed

the

.of proving that the

presumed

fact is more probable than its existence."

burden

shifted

whom

nonexistence

state
it
of

Utah

is
the

Rules

of Evidence, Rule 301.
Even

if the plaintiff had introduced evidence to give

to a presumption and shift the burden of* proof to the
the

defendant

defendant,

need only produce a preponderance of evidence

rebut the presumption.

rise

to

It does not need to prove "for sure" that

8

neither

it nor its independent contractor caused the

plaintiff's

vehicle.

Therefore,

the

trial

court

damage

to

erred

in

imposing a "for sure" standard of proof upon the defendant.

CONCLUSION
As discussed above, defendant is not liable for the torts of
its

independent

shifting
defendant

to

contractor.

defendant

the

The

trial court

burden

of

proof.

also
As

erred

a result,

is entitled to and seeks reversal of the judgment

judgment in his favor as a matter of law,

in

and

or that failing, a new

trial.
DATED this 1st day of April, 1987.
HINTZE,rfrfOWN,FAUST,
BLAKEstil & McPHIE

IKESLEY
Ind Drive, Suite 301
lity, Utah 84106
Telephoned (801) 484-7632
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby certify that on the 1st day of Apriil, 1987, four
copies of Appellant's Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Charley Killian
Respondent, pro se
1601 West 400 South, Apt. 54
Salt Lake City, Utah a

ADDENDUM

RECEIVED JAM o g

Circuit Court, State of Utah
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
CHARLEY KIT.LIAH

Plaintiff

VS.

SALT LAKE CITY

EMPLOYEES

Defendant

CREDIT UNION
Thi» matter came before the court for hearing on the affidavit of plaiffflff, and the defendant has been
served with the affidavit of plaintiff and order to defendant, and return of service has been made. The
following parties appeared at the hearing:
O Plaintiff only. The defendant failed to appear at the time set, and the defendant's default has been
entered.
50 Both plaintiff and defendant appeared and presented evidence.
. Principal
.Court costs, and
$

lal (>*3l

rirV-'^X

TrtTAi JUDGMENT

• *&:.**"<.

DATEO

1-20

1Q

•' s't»

87

Both Plaintiff and Defendant received copies of the Judgment at He&ijno.;\-j\;\\\ f r
Clerk
TO THE DEFENDANT ONLY:
If the above judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff, you now have a judgment against you in
the Circuit Court in the amount specified above. If you are dissatisfied with this judgment, you have only
FIVE (5) DAYS from receipt of this notice to appeal the case to the District Court
TO THE PLAINTIFF ONLY:
You should mail a copy of this judgment to the defendant IMMEDIATELY. The defendant has five
days from receipt of the notice to appeal the case. You must complete the mailing certificate and file the
original of this judgment with the court before you can proceed with any further court action.
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of this judgment, postage prepaid, addressed to the above
named defendants) 6t$) PlAIffl"!FF fPf AfNTTFF) ?BQ1 SttfTH liJRMA.PyiVE, SIX. liTAH M120
(LLfovm) Jbu) SOUTH MAIN STRECT, SALT U« d cm?*Jfefc #015

Dated I—/)

'
WGNATURF

/l<to*tW/&> &7

198;

